Lump sum damages for personal injury are again under attack. Almost twenty years ago the concept of a structured settlement was imported into this country from the USA in order to provide continuing lifetime payments for seriously injured claimants.
veto has been removed by amendment of the Damages Act 1996.
3 Taking into account the needs of the claimant, a judge can make a periodical payments order (PPO) even if it is against the wishes of both parties. The increasing judicial direction of the course of litigation has thus been accentuated.
The tradition in tort damages is for there to be a clean break, with the defendant giving the claimant a once-and-for-all payment to end matters. In contrast, a PPO will produce an uncertain continuing relationship that may vary over time. This is because the periodical payments must be indexed against inflation -no matter what this eventually costs; and the payments can be set to continue for the claimant's lifetimeno matter how indefinite. In addition, judges have been given new powers to arrange for awards to be varied, if necessary, long after trial. It is therefore not only the form of damages that has been changed but also the way that compensation is assessed. The result has been described as marking "the most fundamental change in 150 years in the quantification of bodily injury claims involving continuing losses. The changes will affect not only the level of damages awarded but will also require a new approach to the quantification of claims."
account for the disposition of almost all personal injury cases, the effect of rule changes upon the negotiations between the parties has often been overlooked. In addition to this practical perspective, the article considers the wider economic and political context. In particular, it exposes as being seriously flawed the impact assessment upon which the legislation was founded. Although the changes will result in substantial cash-flow savings for the Exchequer and the National Health Service (NHS), they will cost insurers and premium payers dear. Those pressing hardest for the reform are revealed to be neither claimant nor defendant organisations, but
Departments of State. By emphasising the effect upon public expenditure, the article thus exposes the political dimension of tort law, a feature which has often been overlooked.
In spite of their importance, these changes have been implemented without apparent detection by academics. 5 Tort scholarship is very partial. It is extraordinary how much attention is focused upon issues of liability as opposed to the quantum of damages. Practitioners are bemused by the pre-occupation of academics with the rules on fault: they are aware that liability is infrequently challenged by insurers -being raised as a preliminary issue in only about 20 per cent of their cases 6 -whereas the amount of compensation is almost always open to some negotiation. This article is the first discussion by an academic of these recent reforms in damages, and it goes a little way towards redressing the imbalance in tort scholarship.
THE ATTRACTIONS OF PERIODICAL PAYMENTS
Until 1988 damages at common law were always paid by means of a lump sum, never a pension. It did not matter that the compensation was for losses that might be suffered in the future: both the monthly wage that the accident victim may have lost, and the continuing costs of care that would have to be met, were compensated by one large payment. In recent years this lump sum system has been subject to increasing criticism. In particular, the enormous responsibility for safeguarding the future that it imposes upon a claimant makes it a very worrying means of obtaining compensation.
As a result, a new form of payment via a structured settlement has made limited inroads into the lump sum. Since 1988 there have been over fifteen hundred seriously injured people who have received part of their compensation in the form of periodical payments.
responsible for a lump sum greater than most people will encounter in their lifetime.
The costs of obtaining financial advice concerning investment of the damages can be avoided. In addition, periodical payments can be a very tax efficient means of securing continuing compensation, 9 and they may preserve entitlement to means-tested benefits. 10 From the state's viewpoint, this form of payment is attractive because it encourages the spending of damages on the purposes for which they were awarded.
The compensation is less likely to be dissipated as a result of mismanagement or the depredation of friends or relatives. 11 The injured are then less likely to find themselves reliant in the longer term on the limited resources of the welfare state. This article later analyses the cash-flow benefits that can accrue to the Exchequer where public bodies self-fund periodical payments instead of paying out lump sums. It has been for a variety of reasons, therefore, that periodical payments have received the support of Government, law reformers, judges and, to a lesser extent, practitioners and their clients.
However, further expansion of these payments in the form of structured settlements has been hindered in several ways. Some of these problems will continue to affect the use of PPOs, but one difficulty against which the new legislative regime mounts a frontal attack is the refusal by many lawyers to give proper consideration to the merits of the alternative form of payment. In part, this has been attributed to the innate conservatism of the legal profession, 12 together with ignorance or misconception about what periodical payments actually involve. These doubts have proven especially troublesome when combined with reasonably held concerns about the value of structured payments compared to the anticipated returns on a lump sum when invested in equities. Although for some years it has been emphasised that lawyers have had a duty to consider setting up a structured settlement, 13 in practice they have been examined only in a minority of the cases in which they could have been sought. For example, in 2001 -02 the NHS paid over 500 claims in excess of £100,000 and yet less than ten per cent involved a structured settlement. 14 For cases involving clinical negligence and dealt with by the Court of Protection in 2004-05 the take up was slightly higher, amounting to 26.5 per cent of the total. 15 Sometimes structures have been raised as a possibility only at a late stage in the proceedings, by which time the claimant has become used to the idea of receiving a lump sum, and is suspicious of the change in approach. Claimants have therefore objected to the award. Defendant insurers similarly have had various concerns, although again most of them have lacked foundation. The result has been that, largely through inertia, the lump sum has retained its dominance. A major factor in this has been the ability of either of the parties to object and thereby defeat with ease any proposed settlement based on periodical payments. 16 The recent legislation not only removes this veto but also forces lawyers to consider the merits of the new form of payment in any case likely to come to court. This does not mean that legal conservatism will no longer affect private settlements in the tort system, but it does constitute an attempt to change existing culture. It is to the scope for imposing an award against the parties' wishes that we now turn.
THE SCOPE FOR COMPULSORY AWARDS
If a personal injury case comes to court and involves future pecuniary loss, the judge has no choice but to consider making a PPO. 17 An order can be made even if not requested or wanted by the parties or where they envisaged alternative provision.
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The cases affected will usually be those involving serious injury where claims for future earnings or the cost of care are made. Although relatively few in number, these are much more likely to come before a court and be in the public eye. They are also where the claimant is likely to be in the most need and in the greatest danger of being under-compensated. 19 Although the court's power to make a PPO is limited, the threat of its use affects the bargaining position of the parties in most major cases.
The power to make a PPO is limited in three particular respects. It would be a mistake to assume that because new legislation has been passed it will necessarily be used in the way intended by the draftsman. The legal rules provide a framework for bargaining between the parties, and the results can be very different from the picture of litigation envisaged by the black letter lawyer. Within the shadow of the new rules it is likely that a number of claimants will try to take advantage of the removal of the defendant's veto: they will threaten to take the case to court and burden the defendant with a PPO involving uncertain liabilities unless there is agreement to a higher lump sum than previously was on offer. 34 Exactly the same tactic has been used to obtain higher lump sums instead of provisional damages awards, as discussed below in relation to variation of payments. Somewhat less successfully, insurers may also use the threat of periodical payments to bargain harder with a claimant who is set on receiving a lump sum, or worried about whether the court's assessment of needs will correspond to his own. Can a judge be trusted to leave enough of a contingency lump sum fund to provide for unexpected events? Claimants may also be concerned that even an index-linked settlement may not be enough to pay for their future care
costs. Because of these worries bargains will be struck to settle out of court. The experience of other countries is that these deals have undermined the power to make periodic awards to such an extent that "lump-sum settlements have like termites reduced the rent system to but a hollow shell." 35 Because negotiations between the parties will water down the effect of the reform we can expect lump sums to be commonly used even in the majority of serious injury cases involving future financial losses. But the possibility of imposing a PPO substantially influences the bargaining position of the parties, and it is in that sense that all serious injury cases are affected.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE TYPE OF AWARD: NEEDS DEFEAT

WISHES
In any case involving future pecuniary loss the court must consider making a PPO.
Whether it imposes such an order lies within its discretion and depends upon the any attempt to assign the value of the payments in return for a lump sum will have no effect unless a court agrees to the arrangement and finds special circumstances to justify it. 38 The claimant is thus doubly protected against his own profligacy whether he likes it or not. tort of returning the claimant to the pre-accident position. In particular, as we shall see below, need requires a more detailed analysis of the claimant's future than the tort system has previously attempted.
Apart from need, the court must also have regard to the nature of any financial advice received by the claimant, and "the scale of the annual payments taking into account any deduction for contributory negligence." 40 This financial advice will rarely be that of the claimant's own solicitor for the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 prevents such advice from being given by those who are not authorised.
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Instead the court will require the opinion of an independent financial advisor. This will have to be sought early in the proceedings because, as soon as is reasonably practicable, the court is required to give the parties a preliminary indication of which form of payment it considers the more appropriate. 42 Financial intermediaries will therefore have an even more important part to play than they did in the past with structured settlements, for then they were often involved only at a late stage. The financial projections of these experts concerning the extent that the lump sum will be eroded compared to the constant value of the periodical payments will be crucial in determining the form of the award, and the opinion will now be given at an early stage in the proceedings.
One area of uncertainty is the level of damages below which it might not be worthwhile to move towards a periodic award because its size may not merit the time and trouble involved. Under the old rules the court had to be satisfied that a structured settlement had been considered by the parties in any case involving damages for future 40 Practice Direction 41B 1 (1). 41 A few large firms of personal injury solicitors do have their own authorised investment division.
These firms might have a financial incentive to settle via a lump sum and continue to advise the claimant upon investment. Of course, this arrangement should only be made if it is in the best interest of the client.
loss of £500,000 or more. 43 However, for a periodical payment under the new rules
Ministers concluded that the size of an award should not be the determining factor.
Perhaps they had in mind the experience of the USA, where structured settlements have become commonplace even at damages levels below £100,000. Instead of setting a damages threshold, therefore, Government have left the court to assess only whether arranging the award in a new form might involve disproportionate effort. 44 Although in theory any award of future loss could therefore be paid periodically, in practice a PPO will be less appropriate in certain types of claim. For example, although there is nothing to prevent a court imposing an order no matter what the age of the claimant, the objection of an elderly person to being paid periodically might be expected to have more force given the shorter duration of the payments.
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Another factor affecting the level at which a PPO may be made and the extent they will be used is that, in most serious injury cases, the claimant should be left with a contingency lump sum fund to meet unexpected needs. It is essential that this element of flexibility exists to safeguard the future, even though it is not mentioned in the legislation. 46 There are fears that judges will not take it into account sufficiently.
Capital may be needed not only to buy and adapt accommodation, but also to care for the claimant, for example, in the event of the unexpected death or divorce of his carer spouse. Capital might also be needed if care costs outpace price inflation, as discussed below. For structured settlements in the past, on average, only about half of the award was used to arrange the periodic payments. The remainder was accounted for by interim payments, the capital needed to discharge debts and pay for immediate purchases, and the contingency fund. 48 Will judges take a similar approach?
One area of concern with regard to when an order may be made is whether the award of damages is to be reduced for contributory negligence. 49 This may not become apparent until a late stage in the proceedings, and yet it could be crucial in influencing the financial advisor as to the form of the award. If there is to be a reduction in damages, a PPO may not then be enough to pay the cost of the claimant's immediate nursing needs. It might then be thought better to award a lump sum.
Although that payment is more likely to be exhausted earlier if not within the tax shelter provided by periodical payments, it may be preferable for this to occur and for the claimant's actual needs to be met for only a short time, rather than leaving a permanently inadequate source of funds to offer insufficient protection against needs
which have yet to occur. Where periodical payments are thought appropriate, the court is required to make a fundamental change in the way that it calculates damages: instead of a "top down" it must adopt a "bottom up" approach, 50 thereby focusing more precisely upon the claimant's needs. The more familiar top down approach begins only after arriving at the traditional lump sum. It then calculates the income stream which can be derived from that capital, and this can be used to assess whether it will meet the claimant's annual needs. A common reason for rejecting a structured settlement in the past was that the periodical payments resulting from an annuity purchase did not meet these needs. This top down approach does not avoid the most serious criticisms made of lump sums: the need to forecast how long the payments will be required, and the rate of return, after taxation and inflation, which could be obtained from investment of the lump sum. In particular, the claimant's life expectancy is usually an element in estimating how long the payments will be required. The lump sum will reflect the compromises necessary in making these uncertain forecasts. It is usually only after the lump sum has been calculated using these traditional methods that it is used in a structured settlement to transfer, from the claimant to an insurer, the risk of the claimant living beyond his estimated life expectancy. This is usually achieved by the liability insurer using the compromised lump sum to purchase annuities from a life office to provide a stream of periodical payments for as long as the claimant actually lives, not merely the time he is expected to live. Structures, therefore, usually involve only changing the form of payment after the parties have gone through the traditional approach and, as a result, they retain many of the disadvantages of the lump sum.
"BOTTOM UP" ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS IRRESPECTIVE OF COST
By contrast, for a PPO the new legislation requires a bottom up approach. Unlike top down, this does not require the lump sum to be calculated at all. Instead, irrespective of the capital cost, the court assesses the periodical payments the claimant needs for the future. These payments do not have to be multiplied to take account of the speculative estimates of life expectancy or projected investment returns. Unlike under the traditional form of payment, it is the defendant who is burdened with these risks and thus exposed to an uncertain future liability. When making a PPO the court 50 Lewis op cit n 1 para 9-10 et seq. must specify the annual amounts payable, and sub-divide the award to distinguish loss of earnings from the costs of care and the recurring capital costs. 51 The court must also state at what intervals the payments are to be made, and state the amounts, at current value, of the recurrent costs. The periodical payments will then be indexed to guard against inflation. The risks that arise which relate to both the investment return and the longevity of the claimant are thus entirely transferred to the defendant.
In total a complex budget for life may be needed, and there is great pressure to "get it right." 52 Detailed planning of the claimant's future is encouraged by allowing the payments to increase in steps, or even decrease. 53 However, these variations in payment can only take place if the court specifies in the original order precise dates for the changes to take effect. The court is encouraged to plan for a variety of factors including those affecting earnings (the claimant ceasing to work, or gaining a promotional increase in pay); and affecting care (loss of the existing gratuitous carers, changes in the medical condition). Allowance can also be made for other types of factors such as a change in educational circumstances, perhaps leading to the claimant adopting a more independent, but expensive, lifestyle.
The crucial difference from previous practice is that the court is not concerned with the lump sum cost of providing for these needs. Nor does it have to speculate to the same extent about for how long there will still be such need. is needed to convert the future stream of financial losses into a capital sum representing present day values. The discount rate, in particular, has operated harshly against claimants in the past. Now defendants will not be able to take advantage of the artificial estimates on investment returns offered by the discount rate in order to limit damages. They will be ordered to provide the annual sums, indexed to rise with inflation, irrespective of what it might cost them as a capital sum to make such provision. Furthermore, they will usually be ordered to make these payments for an uncertain period -the rest of the claimant's life.
Again it is crucial to return to what effect the power to make such an award will have upon bargaining between the parties. As already suggested, the move towards imposing an uncertain liability upon defendants will strengthen the claimant's hand.
But how will the mechanics of making the deal be affected? In particular, for costs purposes, how is it to be determined whether offers to settle made by either of the parties are reasonable when one of them is based on the traditional lump sum, and the other partly on an assessment of the claimant's annual needs? In complex cases there could be a mixture of approaches depending upon different care regimes and earnings losses. How is the court to assess the reasonableness of the rejection of a periodical payments offer if it is not based on its capital value but on wider social and family reasons? It would be a matter of considerable concern if the new form of damages were seriously to impede the ability of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement by using the present Part 36 procedures and making payments into court. considerable concern, and they argued strongly against the court being given any extensive powers to revise an award. Considerable difficulties could be caused not only for insurers in having to keep open their files and set reserves for uncertain liabilities many years after the original injury, but also for courts in determining whether the injury continued to be a cause of the claimant's present needs. 58 The new legislation reflects these worries by severely limiting the grounds for review.
However, it also encourages the awarding of stepped payments to cater for future 56 changes. These two approaches to future payments are clearly distinguished in the two sub-headings below.
Traditionally the lump sum award has been seen as putting an end to litigation. In particular, the idea that a court could impose a continuing obligation to make reparation upon a defendant was considered in 1927 to be "quite improper and illegal." 59 Since that date the finality of the award of damages has largely been preserved, although it is subject to the following three exceptions:
Firstly, a structured settlement can be devised to create a continuing liability to make periodical payments. Structures still exist, although the terminology has been removed from the legislation. However, as we have seen, the "top down" approach to a structure merely converts the traditional lump sum into a series of payments, and does not require the addition of any more money than that envisaged in the original settlement. It therefore makes no difference to the structure that the claimant's needs unexpectedly increase over time. No variation of the pre-set payments is allowed, and insurers have therefore not had to face any later review of the settlement.
Secondly, interim awards constitute a limited move away from the once-and-for-all system by allowing a claimant to obtain some compensation while waiting for final settlement or the full trial of his action to take place. The procedure is of particular value where a period of time is required for the claimant's medical condition to stabilise before a firm prognosis can be made about his future needs. Successive awards can be made, although interim payments are limited to a reasonable proportion of the damages to which the claimant would be entitled at trial. Again, no variation of payment is allowed after trial or final settlement.
Finally, a potentially more radical change was introduced in 1985 when the claimant was allowed to obtain a provisional damages order from the court. 
a) Variable periodical payments orders
The new legislation, in effect, enables the provisional damages rules which have been used for lump sums to be applied to periodical payments orders. 62 The payments can be varied and, if necessary, a further lump sum can be sought. The limited grounds for variation are almost the same as those for provisional damages described above. In particular, unforeseen medical changes are excluded because of the high level of uncertainty and potential costs involved. Nor is review to lie if there are unforeseen life-changing circumstances even if these are exceptional. 63 Ministers therefore expect variable orders to be sought infrequently.
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However, the grounds for variation have been extended in one important respect.
Apart from taking account of the possibility of deterioration in the claimant's physical or mental condition, judges may now also allow a variation if there is a chance of a significant improvement in the condition in the future. Previously there had been concern that this might hinder rehabilitation: whether as a result of malingering or because of the subconscious effect, the claimant may not improve if there is a financial penalty for doing so. This possibility has now given way to the more evenhanded approach of allowing for both deterioration and improvement. The bargaining position of defendants has thus been slightly improved. After all, a claimant will not relish the prospect of being spied upon later in life to see if his medical condition has changed. However, because insurers wish to bring proceedings to a close, it is doubtful whether they will drive a case to court to secure this power of review except 
b) Non-variable but stepped orders
In planning for the claimant's future the court is encouraged to anticipate events which will increase, or even decrease, the need for compensation. It can then order that payments be changed, or 'stepped', at the specific dates in the future at which it forecasts that these changes will need to be made. In a Practice Direction, 65 the court has been given examples of when a stepped order might be considered appropriate.
These include where it anticipates that the claimant's earnings will change, or where it considers that it will be necessary to revise the amount of care required. Similarly, provision can be made for changes in future medical costs or for recurrent capital costs. However, in all cases the court must state the specific dates and amounts by which the payments should be varied.
Unlike under a variable order, the increase or decrease resulting from a stepped provision can be made at the later date without any further involvement of the court.
A second difference is that the change in payment takes place irrespective of whether the anticipated event giving rise to it actually occurs. There is no later review, only guesswork in advance as to what the claimant will require in the future. This requires the same crystal ball gazing as when a lump sum is awarded. Windfall increases can therefore occur when the need does not later materialise, and conversely, undercompensation will result if a new need is not anticipated. The precision in the court order is the enemy of flexibility and later need.
Overall, whether involving variable or stepped payments, there has only been a very limited departure from the traditional rule that awards are not subject to later review. The emphasis upon the claimant's future needs is therefore strictly timelimited: needs are of concern at the date of trial only, and generally not thereafter.
INDEXATION OF PAYMENTS: PRICES OR EARNINGS?
65 Practice Direction 41B para 2.2.
One of the major advantages to a claimant of a PPO is that the payments specified will increase in the future to protect against the potential ravages of inflation.
Claimants will not see their damages eroded as they have in the past when the value of the income arising from the lump sum was reduced by economic circumstances beyond the control of the average investor. Instead, the periodical payments are to be treated as varying in accordance with the Retail Prices Index (RPI (8) and (9) as amended by the Courts Act 2003 s 100.
68 Para 354 of the Explanatory Notes to the Courts Act merely states that it is expected that RPI will be used in the great majority of cases. A first draft referred to a different index being adopted only in "exceptional" circumstances, but this was controversial and was later changed to "appropriate"
circumstances. 69 The application to strike out the claim was dismissed in RPI inflation are such that the discount rate should be nearer 1.5 per cent this would increase the multiplier to 40.2. If we then suppose that health care costs will rise at say 1 per cent above RPI, then the discount rate becomes 0.5 per cent and the corresponding multiplier is 53.7. Finally, if we then allow for earnings to rise at say 1.5 per cent over RPI the discount rate is 0 per cent and the multiplier increases to 63.8. In effect, this means that moving to an earnings-based assessment instead of prices could double the amount of damages that can be claimed for the future loss.
If we put this in a historical context the increase in damages becomes even more pronounced. Six years ago the discount rate stood at 4.5 per cent where it had been fixed for the previous thirty years. It used to be conventional wisdom, reflected in the Ogden Tables, that even with regard to a youngest claimant suffering an injury, the effects of which would last for life, the multiplier would not exceed the low 20's.
Using that figure as the baseline it can be seen that damages today for future loss have increased by 50 per cent and involve multipliers in the 30's. If allowance were to be made for a rise in earnings instead of prices the increase in damages will be threefold and the multiplier in the 60's. The indexation of periodical payments therefore has widespread implications for the level of damages in general and the eventual cost to society of the tort system.
PROBLEMS FOR DEFENDANTS: THE TRUE COSTS
Insurers are faced with a variety of technical and administrative problems as a result of the new legislation. These include keeping files open for very many years, and setting reserves to comply with regulatory requirements when future liability is so uncertain. A particular difficulty is the effect of liability to make continuing payments upon reinsurance treaties. A liability insurer might offset the risk of paying high awards by reinsuring liability above a certain threshold. This can affect cases as low as £500,000, although a common level for medium sized companies is around £2
million. No problems are caused where a lump sum is paid because the level which
As noted in the introduction to the Ogden Tables op cit n 70 para 15, the Lord Chancellor's discount rate has never been within 0.5 per cent of the correct rate of return.
triggers the involvement of the re-insurer is clear. However, how is the threshold to apply where periodical payments are involved, 82 and who is to benefit if the payments decrease because the claimant's medical condition has improved?
The focus of this article is not upon these administrative problems, difficult though they may be, but upon the crucial issue of the cost of the changes. It is argued here that defendants will have to pay substantially more to fund a PPO than a traditional lump sum, and that Government failed to anticipate this. The regulatory impact assessment for the legislation argued that the reforms "would not materially increase the value of claims," 83 even suggesting that liability insurers might save 4 per cent by purchasing annuities rather than using lump sums. This is far from the case, and the suggestion that there were savings to be made came as a shock to those with knowledge of the compensation industry: it was based upon "spurious assumptions." 84 The policy implications of the reforms must be looked at afresh.
To understand why the regulatory impact assessment was so very wide of the mark we must consider how most compensators will provide for their liability to make index-linked payments for an uncertain time and for an unknown total cost. Liability for this, 85 and in the past it was almost never done for structured settlements. Unlike insurers, public bodies are able to self-fund the payments from their own resources because they are able to satisfy the security requirement in the legislation. The main public body acting as a defendant is the NHS and it has insisted upon self-funding all payments in recent years. However, most defendants other than these public bodies will be forced into the annuity market to fund PPOs. This could prove difficult and very expensive for them because there are only a small number of suitable financial products available and only at a high cost. underwriting annuities for the "impaired lives" of many of the injured claimants.
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When there is only limited experience of the effect of injury on life expectancy, underwriting becomes far more an art than a science, and a miscalculated gamble can prove costly. As a result the market is limited, premiums have fluctuated widely, and the cost of annuities is high. Yet it remains of crucial importance to the future of PPOs, and the Government has been urged to intervene to stabilise matters.
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The second factor which drives up the cost of annuities is linking them to increases in the RPI. This results in regulatory restrictions being imposed upon the providers.
The life offices are required by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to meet their solvency requirements by providing assets which closely match their liabilities. In practice this means that, to fund RPI annuities, they have been forced to purchase index-linked gilts issued by the Government. These are expensive to buy, the market for them being dominated by pension funds anxious to meet their own statutory obligations to obtain matching funds for their index-linked returns. In addition, Government has made all too few of these gilts available to the market. 89 Because of the high demand and the limited provision the yields have been very low. In turn, this means that the RPI annuity rates offered by providers are poor value. Where the top down approach is used to arrange a settlement they make it difficult to ensure that the periodical payments derived from the traditional lump sum will meet all of the claimant's needs. With bottom up arrangements under a PPO, defendants can now be forced to make RPI linked periodical payments whatever the cost. If they do not selffund, they will be forced to purchase annuities in this limited market. This will prove very expensive for them.
Matters could get worse. If the court were to adopt an index which exceeded RPI insurers would not be able to purchase any financial product in the market which would be guaranteed to match their liabilities. 90 The extent of their reserves would then come under close scrutiny from the FSA. That regulator is likely to prevent insurers from assuming long-term liabilities tied to increases in earnings rather than prices. In contrast, Government bodies are not subject to the same financial services regulation, and are free to self-fund payments without scrutiny of their methods or their reserves. The overall result for liability insurers is that it will be much more expensive to purchase annuities to fund the payments under a periodical payment order than to hand over the traditional lump sum. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the cost of these settlements has increased by as much as a quarter or even a third, and insurance reserves have been revised accordingly. 91 One QC has suggested that the PPO regime 90 However, one product involving a non-RPI flexible annuity (similar to a drawdown pension) has been developed by Canada Life, and was approved by the FSA in July 2005. It has been used in a number of settlements where periodic payments are agreed and not ordered by a court. It was also used where the settlement required judicial consent in Day v Alexander (2005) 15 (7) PI Focus 24, but approval has yet to be sought for its use in a PPO under the new legislation. Previously a with profits policy was developed by NFU but it has now been withdrawn. See Lewis op cit n 16 at 300. These products allow some exposure to the equity market and offer a guaranteed minimum income which appears extremely attractive in securing future care costs compared to RPI linked annuities. However, they probably can only be obtained outside of the PPO legislative structure, and this gives the parties an incentive to settle privately. "is going to cost insurers, both directly and indirectly, a lot more money and expense to service these damages. I do not believe that they have, as yet, appreciated the extent of their troubles."
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One case that was settled privately on an RPI basis illustrates this. If settlement had been based upon the traditional lump sum the multiplier would have been 29.
However, funding RPI periodical payments in effect increased the capital sum need to purchase the annuities such that the corresponding multiplier rose to 45. The cost of future financial loss therefore rose by 55 per cent.
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POLITICS: THE NEEDS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE NHS
As we have seen, there are strong arguments to support the more widespread use of periodical payments. Many of these focus upon the needs of claimants and the desirability of providing compensation equivalent to that which has been lost. On the surface the Government can be seen to be supporting a fairer system which helps ensure that compensation meets needs and is used for the purposes for which it was awarded. These are the only reasons for the reform recently listed by the Department for Constitutional Affairs. 94 But if we look at the organisations that gave most support to the new legislation we get a different picture of the reasons why it was passed. (May, 2002) was change sought by the intermediaries who arrange structured settlements. Frenkel Topping, the innovative firm responsible for arranging the great majority of such deals, has been influential in previous reforms. But it opposed PPOs on the ground that they would unduly interfere with the consensual approach. In total, only a bare majority (57 per cent) of respondents to the Lord Chancellor's consultation paper gave an unqualified welcome to imposition.
Instead the catalysts for the reform lay within Government itself. Although the legislation was the prime responsibility of the Lord Chancellor's Department, it had no enthusiasm to make the change urgently. However, both the Treasury and the Department of Health were keen supporters of immediate action, and they were the driving forces behind the sudden implementation of the enabling legislation.
Parliamentary time was found by inserting the relevant provisions, rather anomalously, into a Bill dealing with criminal law and administration. Claimants' interests were very much secondary to those involving public finance and the demands of the NHS. Far from being what they appear on the surface, the reforms in fact were politically driven.
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The political and economic advantages to Government of periodical payments are as follows. In contrast to the problems faced by liability insurers, Government bodies such as the Ministry of Defence and especially the NHS will make immediate gains. This is because their budgets will no longer be denuded by the loss of large capital sums paid as damages. 97 Their cash-flow will be improved because they can self-fund the periodical payments and they are not required to enter the expensive annuity market. It was forecast that in the first year of the new regime the NHS could save as much as £245 million out of the £330 million they would otherwise have to pay for 96 Similarly, Hardman op cit n 91. award, and this will have an effect even upon those able to self-fund. Moreover, the tax and benefits savings made by the claimant in receiving payments in this way also occurs at a cost to the Exchequer. Secondly, the deferring of payments accumulates a debt which eventually will have to be met. The projection is that after 24 years the impact upon the cash-flow will be negative. That is, at that time not only will the good times come to an end and have to be paid for, but also there will be a real and increasing additional cost to the public purse. This cost may be relatively small in relation to the entire NHS budget, but Government finances should beware of these contingent liabilities, especially in the light of current concern about whether we should be paying more to fund future pensions in general. In effect, it will be our children who will have to find the money to pay for the full cost of today's medical negligence, and they will need to do so whilst keeping a disproportionately aged population out of poverty.
Finally, although the reforms were NHS driven, it must be remembered that clinical negligence comprises only a minority of claims even if attention is confined to serious injuries. Liability insurers remain the predominant paymasters. The NHS was responsible for only 11 per cent of all personal injury claims resulting in an award of over £100,000 in 2001-02. For claims of this size in that year liability insurers paid out more than over £2.26 billion, almost six times as much as the NHS's £0.4
billion. 102 This statistic reveals how the emphasis has been misplaced. In the great majority of cases it will be liability insurers and premium payers who will have to bear the increased costs resulting from the reforms, whilst in the minority of cases, in the short-term, it will be the taxpayer who benefits.
Here again changes have been made which result in an increase in tort damages but also transfer costs from the public to the private sphere. Insurers have recently been made to bear the cost of the removal of legal aid and the introduction of conditional fees. They now pay the claimant's costs, including the solicitor's success fee and the insurance premium against the possibility of losing. Insurers also have been required to pay for the cost of providing social security benefits to accident victims and, more recently, for the cost of their NHS treatment. 103 As a result of the present reforms they now must bear the brunt of further savings in public expenditure. Of course, the transfer results in a "stealth tax" which all premium payers and, ultimately, society at large must pay. Tort law, whether made by judges or Parliament, has always been influenced by politics in the wider sense, 104 and this is especially apparent in the recent and continuing struggles that are taking place over damages law.
CONCLUSION
Giving judges the power to award damages in a form other than that sought by the parties is a major reform. All serious injury cases are affected by the threat of imposition of a periodical payment order, whether or not they eventually come to court. This is because the potential exercise of the power affects the bargains that are struck in the tort system. In addition, the reform undermines the traditional approach to damages, firstly, by requiring "bottom up" assessments which focus upon claimants' annual needs; and, secondly, by guaranteeing that these needs will be satisfied no matter how long the claimant actually lives, and whatever the level of price inflation. These needs are to be met irrespective of the resulting lump sum cost.
The parties must give early consideration to the form in which the damages are to be paid. A change is thus being sought not only in legal method, but also in the culture of personal injury practitioners.
However, the effect of the legislation may be less profound and certainly much harder to see if it is hidden in the settlement system, and predominantly results only in insurers paying higher lump sums than otherwise would be the case. There is every incentive for insurers to settle privately in this way in order to avoid the cost and difficulty of arranging the annuity payments usually required to satisfy a PPO. The new legislation failed to anticipate the problems insurers have in accommodating the new regime within their wider financial world. Because of the difficulties, insurers will be keen to maintain the traditional form of settlement.
In one way or another, the changes will result in many seriously injured claimants obtaining more money at the expense of insurance companies. Also to benefit from the legislation is one group of defendants -Government departments and public bodies, especially the NHS. Unlike insurers, they can self-fund the periodical payments and thereby retain within their budgets the capital sums they would otherwise have to pay. They can avoid paying for today's liabilities until tomorrow.
This effect upon public expenditure was not among the main reasons put forward for the reform. However, in exposing the true costs and benefits of the legislation, this article has revealed a political dimension which could easily be overlooked by the casual observer. Such a perspective merits further study for it can also be employed to analyse other recent, or anticipated, changes in tort law. In particular, the impact upon personal injury law of concern about litigation against the NHS has yet to be given the attention it deserves.
The traditional tort textbook can leave the reader with a very misleading impression about how the compensation system operates in cases of personal injury. 105 In practice, the system is transformed into something which has but a limited relationship to the theoretical picture portrayed. But it is not only the experience of practice which throws down a challenge to tort scholars; it is also changes to the basic rules themselves. This article is concerned with reforms which have been ignored by the academic community even though they undermine the tradition of awarding damages in a once-and-for-all lump sum. They also expose the fragility of the conventional claim that the aim in tort is to return the claimant, in so far as possible, to the position enjoyed before the accident. As such they raise fundamental questions concerning the rationale and future direction of the law of tort. Who really pays, how much, and in what manner, are questions that will not go away.
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